Asia

¿El final de Oriente Medio?

China, un país de contrastes

De la conferencia impartida en la Academia de Caballería de Valladolid.
2011


Éste es un momento particularmente adecuado ya que acaba de publicarse el XII Plan Quinquenal y el séptimo Libro Blanco de la Defensa en lo que llevamos de año.
El título del Seminario, “China, el dragón ha despertado” no podría ser más adecuado. Los chinos hablan de un periodo oscuro, perdido, cuando se refieren al último siglo y pico desde que su contacto con Occidente les desplazó del lugar de preeminencia que dan por sentado que tienen que tener.
De hecho, China se llama a sí misma “El Imperio del Centro”, se considera históricamente la referencia regional, el pivote alrededor del que gira el mundo.

La misma geografía física del país le convierte en una isla dentro de un continente. Los accidentes geográficos que rodean a China hacen de ella un universo aparte. Hablando hace unos meses con una estudiante kirguiz me comentó que, aún siendo países vecinos, nunca había estado en China. En realidad, el paso desde Kirguistán hacia el Este es extremadamente complicado debido a la orografía de la región. Desiertos, montañas y junglas impenetrables rodean China por todos sus flancos salvo el marítimo y enmarcan una región que constituye el núcleo del imperio chino que se extiende por la llanura de su mitad oriental.
Sus disputas territoriales históricas se centran fuera de ese núcleo central, en la periferia. Los contenciosos territoriales con India en la región de Cachemira y de Arunachal Pradesh son, quizás, los más significativos que quedan y su verdadera importancia estriba más en la rivalidad entre los dos países y en el control de zonas estratégicas que en disputas fronterizas por la ocupación física del territorio.

La disolución de la Unión Soviética y el nacimiento de las repúblicas a las que da lugar supusieron, en principio un desafío a la estabilidad fronteriza entre Rusia, China y las repúblicas centroasiáticas. Sin embargo, el dialogo mantenido dentro del Grupo de “Los Cinco de Shanghái” no sólo consiguió delimitar las fronteras entre todos los países y reducir la tensión bélica en la zona sino que dio lugar a la Organización para la Cooperación de Shanghái, una de las instituciones más activas de los últimos años.
El giro político, económico y social que Deng Xiaoping propicia a finales de los años setenta hace que China se integre en una región particularmente convulsa como Extremo Oriente. Las relaciones con la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN) mezclan las tensiones propias de la disparidad de poderío con la necesidad y la conveniencia de colaboración. El agresivo crecimiento económico de los “tigres asiáticos” dio lugar al avance sigiloso del dragón chino.

Al Noreste, la situación en la península de Corea y los mares que la rodean será, seguro, referencia obligada para varios ponentes. Igual que las relaciones con un Japón estancado económicamente y que se mueve entre el mantenimiento de su privilegiada relación con los Estados Unidos y su integración en la región.

Los incidentes a propósito de la soberanía de las islas Diaoyu, llamadas Senkaku para los japoneses que implicaron a un pesquero chino y hasta tres patrulleras japonesas – de las que dos fueron abordadas por el pesquero – muestran el precario equilibrio que se mantiene en las cuestiones de soberanía en las aguas del Pacífico Occidental.

China tiene también sin definir la jurisdicción sobre las islas Spratly y sobre las Paracels, ambas en el Mar del Sur de China.
Pero el contencioso más importante que mantiene China es el de Taiwán. La isla de Formosa, refugio de Chiang Kai Shek y los nacionalistas tras la victoria de Mao, se mantiene separada pero no independiente. “Un país, dos sistemas” fue la fórmula empleada por Deng para definir la situación.
Las excepciones se multiplican en China con ciudades como Hong-Kong y zonas económicas especiales con un estatus mixto y una economía en ebullición.

China es un país étnicamente muy complejo. Si bien la Han es la raza dominante con un 92% del total, la política de “hijo único” que se aplica sólo a sus miembros está haciendo que este porcentaje vaya disminuyendo ligeramente. De entre el resto de las etnias presentes, los Uigures y los tibetanos representan las más significativas por la repercusión política que tienen y por la extensión e importancia de las regiones en las que se asientan tradicionalmente.
Han titulado esta charla “China un país de contrastes”; ciertamente, lo es. Nunca la economía de un país en vías de desarrollo se había situado en segundo lugar en el mundo y con previsiones muy halagüeñas respecto a pasar a ser el primero en breve.

País en desarrollo que presenta, sin embargo, una pirámide de población más propia de las sociedades del primer mundo. (Comentar asimetría de la pirámide respecto a los sexos y tamaño de la pirámide en cada escalón)

Socialmente, el fenómeno más importante que se está produciendo en China es el de la migración, tanto interior, como exterior. 52 millones de nacionales chinos viven fuera del país (peligro de fuga de cerebros) y cada año, durante la última década, se han creado 10’2 millones de empleos urbanos que han sido cubiertos por campesinos en lo que constituye, probablemente, el mayor éxodo de la historia.

Esta migración interna tiene mucho que ver con la estructura productiva que China persigue desde hace treinta años. La industrialización, las manufacturas y el sector de los servicios están creciendo a un ritmo incontenible creando, en ocasiones, desequilibrios graves entre las distintas regiones y entre las emergentes clases sociales urbanas. Las posibilidades que ofrece para empresas extranjeras y el mercado potencial para sus productos han hecho que muchas empresas se establezcan en China.

Son estos desequilibrios los que pretende atajar el XII Plan Quinquenal que acaba de aprobarse por la Asamblea Nacional. La creciente preocupación del Gobierno por el bienestar de sus ciudadanos tiene mucho que ver con la estabilidad del régimen pero eso no resta mérito a las medidas adoptadas. Esta estabilidad puede verse también condicionada por los relevos previstos en la cúpula del poder en los próximos meses y años y que suponen algo más que un cambio de caras ya que se perciben como un relevo generacional en el Partido.

Una buena muestra de la nueva tendencia es la actitud de China ante la situación de sus nacionales durante la crisis Libia. De entre los buques desplegados en el Índico para proteger el tráfico marítimo de la piratería, China destacó una moderna fragata de la Clase 54 frente a las costas libias. Se trataba de la primera vez que un buque de guerra chino cruzaba el Canal de Suez y entraba en el Mediterráneo. El propósito era coordinar la evacuación de 33.000 ciudadanos chinos que residían en Libia. Cuatro aviones Il-76 participaron también en la operación. El Gobierno estaba enviando un mensaje al mundo respecto de sus capacidades para operar en cualquier parte del Globo, pero también enviaba señales a su propio pueblo en las que indicaba su grado de preocupación por la seguridad y el bienestar de sus ciudadanos.
Ciertamente, las manufacturas a bajo precio que todos conocemos han constituido el aspecto más llamativo de la economía china de los últimos años. Sin embargo, como sin duda nos contarán mañana, el modelo productivo está evolucionando rápidamente. La preocupación por la eficiencia energética y el medio ambiente y, sobre todo, por la generación de patentes que den valor añadido a los productos finales está cambiando el perfil de la industria china.
Por importante que sea, en cualquier caso, el aspecto industrial y su repercusión en la economía global, no lo es menos el peso de las finanzas. Las inversiones chinas a través de fondos soberanos y privados o de participaciones industriales están condicionando muchos aspectos de la economía mundial en varios sentidos.
Con tres billones de dólares en reservas en divisas (y un crecimiento respecto del año pasado del 24%), China es el mayor inversor mundial. Posee un billón de dólares en Bonos del Tesoro americanos y el Presidente Hu es recibido por Obama como el “banquero de América”. Sus inversiones en la deuda de los países europeos más afectados por la crisis no son, en absoluto, altruistas sino que suponen un punto de apoyo sobre el que colocar la palanca diplomática china en su momento. La preocupación actual de China es su exceso de reservas en divisas y la estabilidad de la deuda americana.

Hace sólo unas semanas, el vicepresidente del Banco Central chino podía afirmar:
“Como la mayor parte de los países, la política macroeconómica china tiene cuatro objetivos principales: Crecimiento económico, Pleno empleo, Estabilidad de precios y Equilibrio de la Balanza de Pagos. Con un crecimiento medio del 10’2% en la última década, más de 10 millones de empleos creados cada año (a nosotros nos bastaba crear empleo así durante seis meses, no diez años), una inflación que, en esa década estaba todavía en el 2’2% y que sólo ahora empieza a ser un problema, el único “pero” era que la Balanza de Pagos estaba absolutamente descompensada… a favor de China. Y eso, si no un problema económico, es un problema político.
A este respecto, hay que recordar que China ingresó en la Organización Mundial del Comercio hace sólo 9 años.

Sin duda, China es un país de contrastes. La segunda economía mundial no tiene una divisa convertible sino que tiene ligado el renmimbi al dólar estadounidense con unos márgenes de fluctuación más amplios de lo que algunos admiten pero absolutamente controlados por el Partido Comunista Chino. La pugna mundial se dirime tanto o más en los parqués y en las mesas de los Consejos de Dirección que en las aguas del Pacífico.
Hoy por hoy, el motor de esa economía es una mano de obra (780 millones de trabajadores) poco cualificada que acaba de asentarse en las ciudades, procedente del campo y con una tasa de ahorro del 45% de su PIB (comparada con un 5% escaso de Estados Unidos). El nuevo modelo que se pretende impulsar deberá ser capaz de seguir absorbiendo el incesante flujo de trabajadores al tiempo que incrementa su nivel de vida y, con él, el consumo interno y la calidad de la producción.

La crisis en que todavía estamos ha hundido a 50 millones de personas en todo el mundo por debajo del umbral de la pobreza en los últimos años. China, en la última década, ha sido capaz de sacar a 300 millones de debajo de dicho nivel. Un logro sin precedentes… y sin camino de retorno. Esos 300 millones de nuevos burgueses no van a aceptar retrocesos económicos y, una vez consolidados estos logros, empiezan a reclamar avances políticos y sociales acordes a su nuevo estatus.

Para mantener en marcha la maquinaria hacen falta inversiones, de dentro y de fuera. El “dinero caliente” procedente de inversores extranjeros deseosos de subirse al carro chino fluye sin cesar (el mes pasado, la Inversión Extranjera Directa se incrementó un 33% hasta los 12.500 millones de dólares). Hace falta investigación y desarrollo; el Partido ha ordenado incrementar exponencialmente el número de patentes nuevas cada año. De nuevo, la esperanza es que después de la cantidad aparezca la calidad.
También hace falta energía.
Cuando murió Mao, China era exportador neto de hidrocarburos. Desde entonces, la producción ha seguido incrementándose y, sin embargo, China importa la mitad de sus necesidades energéticas. Su apetito voraz se ha convertido en un tópico a estas alturas. El gas turkmeno, el petróleo iraní o saudí, angoleño o sudanés fluyen hacia las fábricas chinas sin cesar provocando efectos inflacionarios en el mundo entero. Los campos eólicos han comenzado a esparcirse por China como si estuvieran llevados por esporas. La preocupación por la contaminación, sobre todo de sus aguas, también ha propiciado el cierre de las fábricas menos eficientes y más contaminantes.
La política exterior china tiene claras estas necesidades. Junto a la presión diplomática respecto de la cuestión de “Una sola China”, los esfuerzos de su departamento de exteriores se vuelcan en el establecimiento de asentamientos industriales y logísticos en apoyo a sus importaciones.

El “Collar de Perlas” de instalaciones portuarias a lo largo del Índico son la muestra más evidente. El desarrollo de su Marina de Guerra y su despliegue en el Golfo de Adén, su manifestación más sorprendente.
Porque, si China es un país de contrastes, es en sus Fuerzas Armadas en uno de los ámbitos donde más se ponen éstos de manifiesto. La flotilla que, en 2.006, desplegó por primera vez frente a las aguas de Yemen y Somalia era la primera incursión de la Armada china fuera de los mares que llevan su nombre desde el siglo XVI, desde las famosas siete expediciones de Zheng He, alguna de ellas por estas mismas aguas.

País sorprendente con el segundo mayor presupuesto de defensa mundial pero inferior al sus fuerzas policiales y con una declarada vocación no intervencionista. Con una Marina que opera en todo el mundo pero que no tiene un solo portaaviones terminado. Ejército masivo hasta hace unos años que ha perdido casi un millón de efectivos con las progresivas reducciones y donde se prima en los últimos tiempos a la Fuerza Aérea y al Segundo Cuerpo de Artillería, la de los misiles estratégicos.

A salvo sus fronteras terrestres tras los acuerdos con los “Cinco de Shanghái”, el Ejército Popular de Liberación vuelca sus esfuerzos hacia el mar donde se siente constreñido por lo que define como las “Tres cadenas de islas” defensivas norteamericanas. Hacia el mar y hacia el espacio, donde ya ha colocado en órbita el octavo satélite de su constelación de GPS, el “Beidou” y hacia el Ciberespacio, al que se dice que dedica nada menos que 180 mil militares, el doble que los Estados Unidos.

Tenemos por delante tres jornadas realmente interesantes para conocer mejor China. Nuestro interés por ellos no debe ser menor que el que tienen ellos por nosotros. En el municipio de Lorca, en Murcia, se levanta el proyecto ZEIC, la Zona Especial de Inversiones Chinas. Una suerte de parque temático gigante junto a un enorme complejo hotelero y turístico y pegado a un superlativo parque empresarial y un gran centro de formación. Su objetivo es asesorar y centralizar las inversiones chinas en África, de la que está muy próximo, Europa, de la que forma parte e Iberoamérica, con la que comparte idioma y cultura.
Desde luego, China es un país de contrastes, contradicciones y paradojas. En el centro de Beijing, con 999 habitaciones, se levanta desde antiguo el Palacio Imperial. Una Ciudad Prohibida convertida en uno de los mayores reclamos turísticos.
No debería sorprendernos tanto que China esté alcanzando este nivel de penetración en los mercados, la cultura y la vida en general de todo el mundo. Si acaso, debería sorprendernos que un país que representa a la quinta parte de la población mundial, un pedazo significativo y creciente de su economía y una parte irrenunciable de su historia no haya tenido, hasta ahora, mayor presencia global.

Drilling for war

As published at:

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/%C3%A1ngel-g%C3%B3mez-de-%C3%A1greda/drilling-for-war

December 23rd 2010

   

Provocative demonstrations of US military might are no way to avert conflict in east Asia, argues Angel Gómez-de-Ágreda

It is almost at the opposite end of the world to Europe. Just a few decades ago, whatever happened in Korea was not of real concern here. Now, it should be.

I neither intend to say that we are under a direct threat nor that we are targeted by North Korean ICBMs loaded with nuclear warheads.  We nevertheless certainly have important interests at stake. The stability of the area should be a key concern for Europe, as it is for the US.

Even if only taking into consideration the importance of our trade with China, Japan and South Korea, it becomes thus necessary for us to acknowledge that any disruption of economic flows would be significant for both sides. Its importance goes beyond the sheer magnitude of the figures involved. Picture yourself in a world where everything “Made in China” had disappeared, even if only for a few weeks; make it a few months without Japanese manufactures, dependant as they are on China’s raw materials. Consider how used to goods coming from east Asia we have become and how we do not even notice their omnipresence in our lives. Open any gadget coming from the US; many of its parts – probably including the “Made in the US” tag – would actually be manufactured across the Pacific.

Of course, that would not be it. If a crisis was to spark in the Yellow Sea, it would create a kind of black hole that would certainly suck huge resources from the nations directly involved in such a crisis, including the US. Such a shock would fulfil the worst imaginings of the world at the height of the current financial crisis.

In this global world, and even more so after Nato’s declared readiness to intervene anywhere, anytime, as stated in Lisbon, does anybody really think that Europe would be left out of the fight?

Given what is at stake in that small faraway island off the coast of both Koreas, we may want to find out what is going on there.

The Korean peninsula is far more important than its size may suggest. Its location, bordering both Russia and China and only a few miles from Japan, makes it a place with unique possibilities. It is worth acknowledging that South Korea’s economy is the twelfth biggest in the world and that if both Koreas were to merge, they might over time surpass Japan’s GDP. The US has just signed afree trade agreement with the Republic of Korea, which is also poised to enter a free trade agreement with China.

The location of the peninsula is also regionally relevant due to its privileged access to the Pacific which both its two powerful neighbours need. Russia looks forward to extending its rail and pipeline systems all the way through both Koreas to increase trade opportunities with them and to gain access to yet another port to boost its exports.

At the end of the Korean War, there were a series of issues left unresolved, and so they remain. One of them is the boundary between both countries, when it comes to the region in which we witnessed the artillery duel last month. North Korea has never agreed to the “provisional” demarcation line. In international affairs nothing is black or white, and Korean waters are no exception, falling within the “grey zone”.

This may explain why the “Democratic” People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) responded to artillery drills considering them enemy fire. Not that it is acceptable behaviour, but it does not appear to be necessary to go play “war games” in a place your neighbour considers “its playground”.

That was precisely the intention of the drills involving nuclear-powered carrier USS George Washington; and remains equally true of the current solo drills by South Korea. Past exercises carried out by the same US carrier, Japan andVietnam in separate drills off the coast of China all bear testimony to the willingness to stir tensions in the western Pacific.

It will not happen in the near future, but I wonder how would the US react to a Chinese naval drill one hundred miles off San Diego, or the Panama Canal; well inside international waters but close enough to make them feel uneasy.

There is no better way to start a war than to make a vain effort to prevent it on your opponent’s doorstep. As history has proven, taking armies to border does not usually deter, but challenge, enemies.

Searching for the Win-Win in East Asia

As published at:

http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=445
September 25th 2010

“In this traitorous world nothing is true nor it is false, it all depends on the color of the crystal you look through” said Campoamor, a noted Spanish poet from the late XIX Century.

Across the World from Spain, the Senkakus are seen in a different light from Tokyo and from Beijing. There is more pride than profit at stake; at least on the islands themselves. There is actually “no territorial issue”.

Francis Fukuyama argues that ideology is no longer the cause of wars. If he is right we will have to conclude that what Beijing is truly seeking is either access to the resources around the Senkakus or free passage through their channels towards the open Ocean; or both.

Norway and Russia just signed an agreement regarding disputed territorial waters in the Sea of Barents. Norway will gain access to resources and provide state-of-the-art drilling technology which the Russians lack.

This becomes a win-win situation in which two potential rivals end up being potential allies in further discussions about the Arctic.

There is little to be gained by either Japan or China in the current state of affairs. Both nations rely on the same maritime lines of communications and there is a huge potential for cooperation in many other areas.

China’s arrival to the already crowded train of Asian economic powers means that we are all going to be a little bit more tight, including China herself. Still, China needs to pay more attention to the subtleties that rule life in the train and avoid using her elbows to make herself comfortable.

Don't Ring the China Alarm Too Soon

As published at:

http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=319
August 20th 2010

Last week’s “Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative”, delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is far more important than it may seem at first glance. Many have focused on the suppression of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) or the role of the Marines. Others stressed the reduction in the number of four-star Generals and its implications for the US military. All just read through the three challenges the Department is facing assuming them as a given. Mr. Gates mentions the three threats which will determine how the DoD’s budgets is spent in the next few years: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, global terrorism and “other major powers investing heavily in their military”.

In my view, that is quite an statement. It is one of those sentences worth reading twice. “Other major powers” is not a random expression; it obviously tries to avoid mentioning one or several nations which are the cause of concern. Still, the simple fact that the US acknowledges the existence of other “major powers” is significant enough and acknowledges the end of the US as the only superpower. As for which might be the nations not mentioned in the sentence there can be little doubt that it is, primarily, China. The US seems to be building a case against the PRC in a somewhat similar fashion as when they did to prepare world opinion for other crises.

What is more, the sentence seems to give the same or similar weight to the sustainment of two wars, to the war on terror and to the need to counter China’s investments. Further down, it cautions against “steep and unwise reductions in defense”.

The US is intent on maintaining its role as global police even with a reduced budget. The way to do it is by having other nations share the costs and responsibilities even if decision making will remain in their hands. They have overstretched their Armed Forces for ten years and now find fresh challenges in more scenarios within Asia so they are having their partners build up their militaries to be able to maintain global reach. Recent announcements of sales of F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia and Air Defense Systems to other Gulf nations bear witness to it. The same can be found further east with Japan, Australia and others increasing their investments in defense.

The other significant point in the document deals with reduction in the number of contractors. There are more US civilians working and fighting in Afghanistan than military. The reduction in the number of troops which took place after the Cold War came with a surge in the number of civilians working for the DoD. This week saw the withdrawal of the last “combat troops” in Iraq (how do you call the 50000 troops who remain?), only to see 7000 civilians replace them, somehow contradicting the spirit of Mr. Gate’s statement.

While the rise of an aggressive superpower must always be prevented, new times demand new ways to deal with crises like North Korea’s, Iran’s or the one being orchestrated around the South China Sea. All nations have the right to develop peacefully and, ironic as it may seem, the military is part of that peaceful development. Cornering an enemy only makes it more dangerous. A new arms race is not the way to build a more secure world though. It only benefits “hawks” and defense corporations.

One Drill Too Many?

As published at:

http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=208
July 21st 2010

The seas in the Western Pacific are troubled waters these days. Most major powers seem to have decided that this is the right time and place to promenade their ships. The stroll always happens to be too close to someone else’s “core interests” although they are never “intended against a particular nation”.

After Russia’s and China’s exercises during the last few weeks, the US Navy is delivering what it promised and later delayed. The USS George Washington is touring the Southern tip of the Korean peninsula as a sign of support to the Republic of Korea. Its presence is intended to send a warning to its Northern neighbors after investigations showed their likely involvement in the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan.

Or is it?

PanOrient News’ “Scientist Reject Cheonan Report” casts some doubts regarding the impartiality of the investigation. When I first heard the news about the sinking of the patrol ship and the subsequent reactions in Seoul and Washington I could not help but recalling the story of the “Maine”. The US Battleship mysteriously exploded in the Havana harbor in 1.898. American media immediately blamed the Spaniards – Cuba was part of Spain at that time – for the blast and the US used the incident as an excuse to finish off the dying Spanish Colonial Empire.

Of course, nothing suggests that this incident has any resemblance to the Maine’s or the “Tonkin Ghosts”’s which sealed the involvement of the US in Vietnam.

Yet, the presence of the aircraft-carrier flotilla in those waters can hardly be seen as a message to the DPRK. Hardly any article covering the event places the North Koreans at the receiving end of the communiqué. Instead, China is perceived as the nation “the message is not intended to”.

While the Republic of Korea probably welcomes the reassuring presence of their ally’s Task Force, it is unlikely that it will make a difference in real terms north of parallel 38, especially if the two scientists doubting the torpedo version are right.

The 97,000 t carrier and its escorts are the last thing the Chinese want to see near their home waters. On the other hand, visibility is one of the advantages the US can get from this drill. With its presence in Japan being questioned, it could be used as a good example of the benefits implied in their staying in the islands.

Freedom of usage of the SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communications) is the alleged target of all major powers in the area. Japan, being an archipelago, is most reliant on shipping for its very survival. China, a major trader, needs secure access to markets and resources, both of which come basically by sea. Still, when it comes to securing the very sources of survival, no one wants to rely on anybody else’s Navy.

With Russia using the Northern Territories for their exercises, China harassing Japanese ships in the Southern islands’ sea and tension mounting in the Korean peninsula, the Western Pacific waters are hotter than ever. With all parties poised to show their strength and determination we may end up having one drill too many.

Losing more than Afghanistan

As published at:

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/%C3%A1ngel-g%C3%B3mez-de-%C3%A1greda/losing-more-than-afghanistan

July, 14th. 2010

   

The war in Afghanistan could leave Nato powers excluded from the whole of central Asia, argues Ángel Gómez-de-Ágreda.

Overoptimistic calculations by western powers estimate that we are losing the war in Afghanistan. Far from it, we are losing the whole of Asia and, what is even worse, the credibility of the Alliance and the values it defends.

The excellent remarks by Valey Arya, in openDemocracy’s “Afghanistan: one conflict, three faces”, help us understand the depth and width of this war. Most analyses fail to see the whole picture and what it is at stake here. Not that the image is blurred or obscured, it is just that we do not dare look at all the implications. A mere glance at the map shows how Afghanistan seems to stretch itself so that it is in contact with so many troubled nations and regions, as if it delighted itself with problems.

Man has been making war in basically the same way for millennia. We have tried to disguise it with a coating of respectability and make it look “more human”. Where did we get the notion that “human” meant bloodless? Even worse, how could we ever think that we could “civilize” war? War is about winning or losing and there is no greater nonsense than a war between someone who has nothing to lose and he who has nothing to gain.

Most of Asia is sitting on the stands of the Afghan stadium watching this absurd game and sounding their vuvuzelas. NATO and the US are defeating themselves at a very low cost for competing powers.

Not even the business opportunity represented by the announcement of the trillion dollars worth of mineral riches in Afghan soil has increased interest in the country. Even McChrystal’s sacking had more media coverage.

Neighbours benefit from Afghanistan not using all of its water for lack of infrastructure but they gain little more than that. The rest of the “stans” to the north have to endure Islamic extremists sheltering there and opening new franchises in central Asia. Tension is also derived from the US presence atManas Airport, with the Russians staying only a few dozen miles away at Kant and agreements built and broken on usage rights.

While the situation lasts, resources coming from the “stans” cannot travel south and they are stuck with Russia and China as their only markets or transit routes. The gas and oil pipelines projected to link Iran, China, Pakistan and India are on hold, to the delight of the other regional powers.

Pakistan fears that ethnic realignment will split the country in three. That would not only benefit India, but probably China also. Colonial borders negotiated under the British (the Durand Line, in this case) did not take into account realities on the ground and most of the wars fought by the western powers these last decades are the result of HMG’s policy back then.

Paul Rogers argues that NATO and the US are not seen as neutral although their citizens think of themselves as saviors of the universe, the white-hat cowboys of the movies. While they will continued to be as such for the foreseeable future, there is an increasing portion of the population who are no longer under the illusion.

There is nothing left to be gained in Afghanistan. Not at a reasonable price. NATO is staking its own credibility in a lose-or-lose game. In a previous article I wrote about the interest of Asian nations in getting rid of US presence in Asia. They will not push the coalition out of Afghanistan but rejoice in its failure and profit from the outcome.

The west has overstretched itself for years focusing on military power while the east was growing stronger. NATO is the strongest alliance on earth but can ill-afford to challenge Asia in Asia. No one can win that fight.

A fourth way out of Afghanistan might be possible. Ideally, it would include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization taking charge of the stabilization process with some Alliance forces ready to cleanse emerging terrorist havens. Ad-hoc Special Operations are preferable to a massive presence, leaving a very shallow logistical footprint while aid could be withdrawn in favour of trade.

We are bound to choose the lesser of two evils. The choice is either quitting or being defeated. And we need to keep in mind that there is far more at stake than Afghanistan itself. The strategic fate of the whole of central Asia, the keystone of what Halford Mackinder called the Heartland, is mostly dependent on what happens here.

Risky Business in Afghanistan

As published at:

http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=151
July 4th 2010

While last month’s news that Afghanistan was giving Japan priority access to its trillion dollars worth of mineral deposits were encouraging for the archipelago, it remains to be seen how this is implemented.

A promise by Mr. Karzai is as good as his ability to remain in power. Afghanistan’s President is negotiating with various Taliban leaders so as to grant them limited access to Government responsibilities. He is doing his best to secure his post once the Coalition leaves. One could bet that he is also prepared for a failure of this option.

Hand-picked by the US for reasons which escape me, Karzai’s most evident ability is that of surviving and preparing for the unforeseen. He has not been the puppet the Americans wanted and neither the leader the Afghans needed. And yet, like many others, that is no proof that he will not remain in power.

The war in Afghanistan is all but lost. It should not come as a surprise for anyone as that was the result of almost all prior invasions to that territory. All former conquerors failed to retain it and suffered humiliating defeats but for Genghis Kan.

Not that other peoples accept a good-willed invader much better. When Spain was invaded by Napoleon back in the early years of the XIX century the story was quite the same. You could argue that the French brought a much more advanced standard of living to the mainland. They were far better rulers than Ferdinand VII, whom they dethroned, and tried to bring prosperity to Spain. But they were still seen as invaders. They tried to change Spanish traditions and underestimated the importance of religion and that united the whole nation against them.

Now it is too late for the Coalition to act with a heavy hand or to try a different approach. Victory for the western powers would be that NATO and the US themselves do not lose all credibility – which could lead to dire consequences for the former – and that Central Asia is not lost to the West for good.

It is time to rethink the role of the different Alliances in the World order. If the US is to prove that they are not seeking their own interests but that of the countries they “stabilize”, they will have to accept that there are limits to where they can deploy. Other organizations, such as the SCO, need to step forward and play a more significant role in crises like than of Kirghizstan.

As for the promises to Japan to gain access to mineral resources, one has to wonder whether Karzai can keep it without the Coalition backing him and whether he can keep it with a US-led Coalition backing him. 

Closing In on Iran

As published at:

http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=131
June 28th 2010

CIA Director, Leon Panetta, believes that Iran has enough Uranium to build two nuclear weapons. That said, he also states that it should take the Islamic Republic at least another two years to develop the bomb. Of course, President Ahmadinejad denies it all and no prove is likely to be presented due to Iran’s opaque policy.

The whole story resembles so much former claims of Middle Eastern Countries’ WMD possession by the CIA that many nations and citizens around the world are likely not going to buy it unless some hard evidence is produced. Divergent data provided by US officials as to the readiness status of Iran’s program is not helping either.

In the meantime, Israel has reportedly sent military support materiel to Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal Air Base and is also said to have transferred some assets to Air Bases in the Caucasus as part of their plans to stop the Iranian atomic program at all cost.

From the operational point of view, Israel’s operation is both complex and risky. Even without the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft defense system, Iran has a quite solid deployment and targets are dispersed and difficult to reach. For the Operation to be successful, not less than forty aircraft need to be involved simultaneously. Although Israel is capable of such a feat, achieving it at such a range and from foreign bases poses an even bigger challenge.

Recent events made it even more difficult to count on Turkey for transit permits or logistic support and a direct flight from home bases over Syria, Jordan or Iraq is almost certainly out of the question.

The fact that Russia and China voted for the sanctions at the UNSC does not imply that they will approve on the attack. Both powers have significant interests in the Islamic Republic which they will not want to see threatened. The watered sanctions China allowed to pass were sending a message of political restrain more than a permission to bomb the country. The political cost of the attack could be much higher than the attrition suffered by the jets.

Whether or not Iran intends to build the bomb remains to be seen. There are legitimate reasons why they would want to develop nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes and we can ill afford to make another mistake in the area.

If we are certain enough that it will take Iran at least two years to build two bombs we should not take steps that will precipitate the outcome. Stakes are real high here and, while no one denies Israel’s right to self-defense, nor should Iran’s right to access nuclear energy be forfeited.

Out of Asia

As published at:

http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/%C3%A1ngel-g%C3%B3mez-de-%C3%A1greda/out-of-asia

June, 4th. 2010

The meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation could hail a realignment of power politics in Asia, argues Ángel Gómez-de-Ágreda

Meryl Streep and Robert Redford will probably not be starring in this movie. In fact, this is a decidedly anti-Hollywood affair (the US having been rejected in 2005), though it could be Bollywood's next super-hit; India is poised to finally join the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation).

The SCO is meeting next week and they are most likely going to decide on the terms for allowing other nations to join the Organisation. India is the most likely candidate to be the first to exchange its observer status for full membership.

If India was to join the SCO – and more so if Pakistan did too – a radically different scenario would emerge. Regional rivalries and border conflicts between the two giants would be provided with a forum to be discussed peacefully and common goals would probably diminish the impact of former hostilities.

India could benefit from the group's shared interest in stopping radical and terrorist groups and synergies could be found to further develop the energy network which is already being developed among SCO members.

Seen by some as an anti-western partnership, the SCO has proven a solid institution so far. Its declared aim is to maintain stability in and around the nations which take part in it. The main goals are to fight separatism, terrorism and extremism. Non-interference in inner matters is, nonetheless, of paramount importance in its philosophy. The recent events in Kyrgyzstan fall entirely into its domains. 

Custom made to meet the needs of a turbulent region, the SCO has become the key organization in Asia. Including Russia, China and the “stans” which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, it serves also as a confidence-building institution in a region which could definitely use a lot of it. Unlike the European Union, which was born as an economic institution and is now developing a security and foreign affairs body, the SCO was founded as a security organization and developed very quickly into a forum for economic cooperation among member states.

A few military exercises have been executed by the SCO during the last few years. Although it is not meant to be a defence organization, it has shown an interest in the situation in Afghanistan and could very well play a role in the stabilization of the country. The conflict, after all, is not circumscribed to that country alone but is felt by many of its neighbours with which the Taliban have links. 

Asia’s self-awareness in embedded in the spirit of the organization. Catalyzed by the massive presence of the US in the continent, the SCO claims that it is not an anti-American or anti-western institution, but one that seeks “Asia for the Asians”, a replica of the Monroe Doctrine in America. That perception could change if Iran – also a candidate – joined the organization anytime soon.

While the SCO tries to push the US out of Asia, the new National Security Strategy developed by President Obama’s administration remains ambiguous as to the US desired role in Asia. While it acknowledges that the world cannot and must not be ruled from a single capital, it still seeks universal leadership and makes this ambition its key point.

Many of the institutions which have led us to the present through the dark years of the Cold War are useless or counterproductive today. The SCO is a more modern concept far better suited for the global world. Ad-hoc groups and initiatives make much more sense than old-fashioned, western-led groups. 

New powers are challenging the need for the US to lead all initiatives time and again. The deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil regarding the enrichment of Iranian uranium is but the most prominent example. The US should grow accustomed to these deals even if it is contrary to the doctrine expressed in the new National Security Strategy which claims that nothing can be achieved without the US.

SCO heads of state meet in Tajikistan, August 2008. Wikimedia/Kremlin.ru

The world should no longer be conceived as the competition of the west against the rest. Firstly, it is not in the west's best interest to pursue that line of action. Secondly, it is no longer clear that the west would prevail. The US may be ready to lead, but there are many nations willing to contribute in their own right. A more cooperative approach is needed to solve the many challenges facing the world today.

The only rules the nations of the world will accept are those which apply to all. Gone are the days in which there were nations with rights and nations with duties. Most of the wars we are fighting today derive from that same notion of colonial times and are precisely those which are going to meet more opposition.

Also, it remains to be seen whether the SCO would survive an eventual withdrawal of the US from Asia. Deprived of that raison d’etre, tension could grow unbearable between the different powers. 

For the time being, the writing is on the wall; cooperation is a necessity in Asia. Crises are arising throughout the continent, from Israel to Korea, and no single nation can face all of them at the same time.

Energy Security in Asia-Pacific

(As published 29 March 2010)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is, in my view, the prototype of modern international organization. The daughter of the fall of the USSR and the rise of China, it arises from the need of each other and the desire to avoid third party interference in their "backyards". When Uzbekistan joined the group of the "Shanghai Five", the first goal of the new organization was, as stated in its charter, combating terrorism, extremism and separatism. At a time when Russia was facing the three events in the Caucasus, China in Tibet and Xinjiang and Central Asian republics sought to consolidate their domestic regimes in an environment of tolerance, the establishment of the SCO appeared almost more as a necessity than a virtue. Some claim her as anti-NATO or blatantly contrary to Western interests, but although there is no doubt that there are conflicting ambitions in Asia, no openly hostile demonstration has been detected so far.

In the Asian idiosyncrasy, the mechanisms that generate trust have an importance that, in the West, we tend to underestimate. The fact that the two great nations of the continental Far East meet regularly and seek points of agreement on certain issues have a relevance that we can hardly overestimate. Do not forget that the vast frontier of the Russian Federation with the Peoples Republic of China has been a source of tension and place of military – and nuclear – buildup for many years.

At a long, even medium, term it will be very difficult to keep a stable balance between the two powers. This statement will be particularly true when India finishes entering the equation and more if, finally, Iran becomes a nuclear power. On the margins of the table we have yet to take into account Turkey, partner and competitor at the time of Russia and Iran, Japan and Indonesia who, for the time being at another level, has many of the characteristics needed to become an important regional power.

Many "confidence-building" organizations proliferate throughout the continent but they lack the scope – or do not have enough participants – to bring countries together as the EU has done in Europe. Asia lacks a unifying mechanism and a clear and acceptable leader that would unite the nations and make the best of the economic period they are going through. Other than that, they have all the ingredients to become the main characters in the century.

Sufficiency – easily mistaken for arrogance – regarding European geopolitical role can prevent us to be aware of the magnitudes we are talking about when dealing with the economy and resources of the Asia-Pacific region. The Western attitude towards Russia and Turkey can be particularly damaging in the medium term if these countries end up feeling excluded from Europe and turn to their Asian side. Both nations have a dual component in their culture that makes it difficult for us to deal with them. Yet allowing the Asian side of their personality to take over is not the best possible policy for them and certainly not for Europe.

Another feature is shared by the two countries: they are the gateway to the huge reserves of Asian gas and oil towards a thirsty Europe with very limited reserves of its own. And both nations intend, of course, to take advantage of its geostrategic position and become a mandatory passage for pipelines. The lever that the closing of the valves provides became clear Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis. With the Russian Federation being a de facto agent of Gazprom and the pipeline from Algeria and gas coming by sea as the only alternative for Europe, the mutual dependence between Russia and Europe is inevitable in the short term.

In fact, when examined in the light of energy security, recent events acquire a little more sense than they appeared to have at the time. Thus, the War of Georgia can be considered within a strategy that seeks to hinder the viability of the Nabucco pipeline. Of core Anglo-American participation, the pipeline aims to bring the vast deposits of the Central Asian republics to Europe without having to rely on Russian taps. The two possible routes pass through Azerbaijan and Georgia the first one and through Iran the second one. Discarded the latter for as long as the nuclear dispute with the Islamic Republic stands, Georgia held the key of the project.

The Russian Federation opposes her options North Stream and South Stream to Nabucco. They, in turn, avoid crossing Ukraine and use the bottom of the Black Sea (in the case of South Stream) and its ally, Belarus (for the North Stream), to reach Europe.

At stake is much more than the supply of the all-important European market. The monopoly of supply is also a considerable influence that goes beyond the purely economic.

Much of the gas coming through Nabucco should be from Turkmenistan. Its export would be greatly facilitated if the Caspian Sea bottom could be used just as the Black Sea’s. This option, however, was vetoed by Russia for "environmental reasons". Cut westward by the sea, South by Afghanistan and Iran (and by the mountains of the Hindu Kursh), the Central Asian republics are penned by the two big Asian giants to channel their exports.

Cultural and historical reasons diverged, until very recently, almost all production to the Siberian branch of the Russian Federation’s pipeline and Russia became, in fact, the official distributor of the "Tans’” oil and gas. However, Chinese demand growth, the lack of maintenance of Russian facilities and the implementation of the unwritten rule that every exporter needs "two alternative routes, possibly three," China has been able to gas company into the business of its partners in the SCO.

On the one hand, China is supplied by a derivation of the Siberian branch by making its exports coming Turkmenistan and the rest of its neighbors, on the other, the "Middle Kingdom" has sponsored a direct pipeline to its Xinjiang province through Uzbekistan and Kazakstan.

Another series of decisions that are best understood when viewed under the microscope of energy security are those relating to sanctions against Iran by China and Russia. Far from not being concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran, the two Asian powers seek to avoid, where possible, clashes with the Islamic Republic is set to be one of the key pieces in the stability of the continent.

For Russia, Iran - along with Turkey - is a potential source of support for radical Islamists, who have caused so many problems on its southern flank and good relations with both are of great importance for Moscow. For China, Iran is a huge oil well can help to appease the voracious appetite of the Chinese manufacturing industry. In fact, China has contributed to financing the pipeline linking Turkmenistan with the Persian republic. This new line should help to avoid lack of local supply, but seen from a little further, almost closes the circuit to allow a point the Chinese supply from Iran by land.

Because the vast majority of Chinese imports of oil is carried by sea across the Indian Ocean. Although domestic production and imports of their neighbors, most of the oil it consumes, the country comes from Africa (mostly from Angola and Sudan) and the Middle East.

This has led, in principle, the remarkable growth and modernization of the Navy of Chinese People's Army with an impulse decided to deep-sea fleet and plans for the acquisition or manufacture of a Naval Air Group. Secondly, it has meant the involvement of units - three at the time of writing - from the Chinese navy to support the safety of the waters in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Hormuz. Last but not chronologically, has favored the creation of the "necklace of pearls". The pearls would possessions or Chinese establishments along the route linking Port Sudan to avoid Hong Kong as a potential rival India.

The maritime route that suggests the "Necklace" through straits as dangerous for navigation as the Malacca and the Hormuz (although Lombok, Indonesia and Mandab versus Djibouti) and requires its own or shared infrastructures settlements in Pakistan, Sri Lanka , Maldives and Somalia. All these facilities represent an increase of the Chinese diplomatic presence in the area and, in many cases, the use of so-called "soft power". The sale of frigates and next-generation aircraft to Pakistan falls in the latter case as well as cooperation with Iran (Bandar-e-Abbas), Sri-Lanka (Hambantota) and Pakistan (Gwadar) for construction or expansion of port facilities.

Particularly dangerous Malacca Strait, only two and a half miles at its narrowest point, has led to China to study even the creation of a canal across the Isthmus of Kra to prevent it and the construction of a pipeline passing through Myanmar avoid crossing.

 A "collateral" effect of all this is seeking as part of India, to counter China's growing power and presence in "their" ocean. The Indian is passing through its waters no less than 17 million barrels of oil a day, 20% of world production and claims for itself a greater role in several aspects (also Ocean washes the shores of most Islamic countries , from Somalia to Indonesia, through the Persian Gulf and Pakistan, nuclear).

Another unwelcome presence in the Indian Ocean is that of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. The largest U.S. fleet is also supported on the island of Diego Garcia, home to a British base for joint use that has served as a starting point for much of the Allied missions in the recent wars in Southwest Asia. Recent reports show Americans, by contrast, a growing concern that the growth of Chinese naval power.

Another feature common energy to the whole area is the use of resources and inefficient processes and highly polluting. 70% of China's energy consumption comes from coal mined from its own mines (more safely than debatable) and the use of renewables is negligible in all cases.

Not everything is energy security in Asia despite the weight, as shown, has this in the overall concerns of the continent. Even in a globalized world, we can say that the issues that really are important are circumscribed to a specific region. Thus, Africa plays a growing role as a supplier of raw materials and energy to Asia. India and Japan are following, by far, the steps of China in terms of penetration in the black continent.

Also, the economy and finance have their continental and global aspects. The surplus capital accumulated trade surplus with China in most of these exchanges have posted to Beijing as the largest investor in U.S. debt that first ousting its neighbor, Japan. Disagreements that Washington and Beijing remain regarding their respective exchange rate policies and mutual accusations of keeping their currencies artificially undervalued to boost exports have not declined, so far, the Chinese interest in American bonds.

However, both the excess of foreign exchange and the potential for a currency exchange recognized worldwide have led to the People's Republic shy to initiate a process of internationalization of the yuan renminbi. That a currency for use exclusively national, have come to promote it as payment to the Central Asian republics and members of ASEAN, which has resulted in an equivalent reaction by Russia with the ruble.

Economic growth in the leading emerging nations of the area catches the attention on the prospects who have until mid-century. By then the Chinese GDP will almost double the American and Hindu whether he will walk just behind the latter. Indonesia, with growth expected in the order of almost 600% in the second quarter of the century will exceed the GDP of Japan and other economies in the region achieved growth similar proportion (Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh, while more modest savings, will also grow by up 500% in twenty years).

One of the most striking paradoxes of the current situation is that almost all the main parties are happy with maintaining the status quo. United States intends to maintain its current hegemony which needs stability and to retain control of trade. China intends to maintain its double-digit annual growth, allowing it to become the first world power before 2025. Their needs coincide with the United States and collide with them about the need for access to energy resources and raw materials. The other major nations have a similar line, with long-term goals nearly coincident and, therefore, tend to be in a near future more or less competitively.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not, in principle, an institution clearly opposed to Western interests or NATO, however, apart from the preservation of the regimes of member nations, pursuing objectives that in many cases, crash with those of NATO countries. For Russia and, if anything, even more to China, the U.S. presence in Asia is a competitor added to the already saturated continental race. Reducing the Western presence in areas of interest from Russia and China is more a way of asserting their own presence in areas of influence than an end in itself.

Asia is dotted with emerging powers in different stages of evolution. Of the four BRIC group members, three are in the area. Apart from them, Pakistan (as a nuclear power), Turkey, Indonesia, Japan and Iran are attaining the status of regional power and play an important role in the balance of power on the continent.

The production and distribution of energy resources plays a key role in the economy of almost all these countries. Either as producers or as a stopping or as a consumer, Asian countries in energy resources are a focus of priority attention. The establishment of zones of influence, captive markets, transit stations and energy partnerships with countries or companies are behind many of the policy and strategic decisions affecting Asia.

Russia and Turkey have a strong position regarding Europe's energy supply. China aims to compete with Europe by the resources of Central Asia and Africa and, together, form a complex web of relationships that mixed issues of international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the use of water resources and arms races to protect all those interests.

Like China

(First posted in 2010)

Last week’s “Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative”, delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is far more important than it may seem at first glance. Many have focused on the suppression of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) or the role of the Marines. Others stressed the reduction in the number of four-star Generals and its implications for the US military. All just read through the three challenges the Department is facing assuming them as a given. Mr. Gates mentions the three threats which will determine how the DoD’s budgets is spent in the next few years: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, global terrorism and “other major powers investing heavily in their military”.

In my view, that is quite an statement. It is one of those sentences worth reading twice. “Other major powers” is not a random expression; it obviously tries to avoid mentioning one or several nations which are the cause of concern. Still, the simple fact that the US acknowledges the existence of other “major powers” is significant enough and acknowledges the end of the US as the only superpower. As for which might be the nations not mentioned in the sentence there can be little doubt that it is, primarily, China. The US seems to be building a case against the PRC in a somewhat similar fashion as when they did to prepare world opinion for other crises.

What is more, the sentence seems to give the same or similar weight to the sustainment of two wars, to the war on terror and to the need to counter China’s investments. Further down, it cautions against “steep and unwise reductions in defense”.

The US is intent on maintaining its role as global police even with a reduced budget. The way to do it is by having other nations share the costs and responsibilities even if decision making will remain in their hands. They have overstretched their Armed Forces for ten years and now find fresh challenges in more scenarios within Asia so they are having their partners build up their militaries to be able to maintain global reach. Recent announcements of sales of F-15 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia and Air Defense Systems to other Gulf nations bear witness to it. The same can be found further east with Japan, Australia and others increasing their investments in defense.

The other significant point in the document deals with reduction in the number of contractors. There are more US civilians working and fighting in Afghanistan than military. The reduction in the number of troops which took place after the Cold War came with a surge in the number of civilians working for the DoD. This week saw the withdrawal of the last “combat troops” in Iraq (how do you call the 50000 troops who remain?), only to see 7000 civilians replace them, somehow contradicting the spirit of Mr. Gate’s statement.

While the rise of an aggressive superpower must always be prevented, new times demand new ways to deal with crises like North Korea’s, Iran’s or the one being orchestrated around the South China Sea. All nations have the right to develop peacefully and, ironic as it may seem, the military is part of that peaceful development. Cornering an enemy only makes it more dangerous. A new arms race is not the way to build a more secure world though. It only benefits “hawks” and defense corporations.